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How Context Mediates the Effects of 
Electoral Institutions on the Structure 






Do electoral institutions in Africa’s emerging democracies impact the strategic 
coordination among voters, candidates and parties and shape the structure of 
party systems independently or are their effects mediated by contextual 
variables?  The paper attempts to answer this question through analysis of 
systematic data on 99 national legislative elections held under 55 electoral 
systems in 37 countries.  Specifically, it examines how two contextual variables 
– (1) institutional variables related to presidential elections and (2) patterns of 
ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration – mediate the direct effects of 
electoral institutions on the structure (degree of fragmentation or concentration) 
of party systems.  Regression analysis shows that electoral institutions have 
negligible independent effects, while contextual variables independently and 
interactively with each other and with electoral institutions account for the 
largest amount of variance on the degree of fragmentation or concentration of 
party systems.  The conclusion discusses the implications of the results for the 




An extensive comparative literature provides incontrovertible evidence that both 
electoral institutions and context shape the structure of party systems, but it also 
remains divided in privileging each with mutually exclusive causal 
significance.1  If both institutions and context matter, then privileging one with a 
priori theoretical precedence is conceptually misconstrued.  A more appropriate 
analytical task is to explicate theoretically and empirically how they matter.  I 
undertake this task in the paper with a systematic analysis of the separate and 
joint impact of context and electoral institutions on the structure of party 
systems in Africa’s emerging democracies. 
 
                                                     
1 I do not cite this extensive and well-known literature to save space.  Cox (1997: 14-27) 
provides a useful summary and synthesis 
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Theoretical explication of how institutions and context shape the structure of 
party systems raises a number of analytical questions.  First, since both 
institutions and context matter, what is the best way to specify this relationship 
without privileging one with a priori theoretical precedence but enabling 
empirical validation of their separate and joint effects?  Second, institutions 
derive their theoretical significance as efficient sources of strategic coordination, 
but what is the mechanism by which contextual variables structure political 
interactions?  Third, social cleavages are the standard contextual variables 
hypothesised as conditioning party systems, but should all objectively 
identifiable cleavages be included in the analysis or only those that are 
politicised?  If only politicised cleavages are to be included, then how does one 
deal with the problem of endogeneity?  These questions have particular 
relevance for the inclusion of ethnic cleavages as the key contextual variable in 
the analysis presented in this paper.  In much of extant scholarship, the mere 
presence of objective ethnic cleavages is typically interpreted as a reflexive 
indicator of their political salience.  But, like other social cleavages, not all 
ethnic cleavages are politicised and not all politicised ethnic cleavages become 
the basis of partisanship.  Fourth, a growing body of comparative scholarship 
over the past two decades attests that ethnic groups and identities are not 
primordially fixed but are constructed in the course of social, economic and 
political interactions.  Since not all constructed ethnic groups and identities 
become politicised, is it possible to classify constructed and politicised ethnic 
groups (i.e., ethnopolitical groups) and develop measures of the resulting 
ethnopolitical cleavage patterns? 
 
To answer these questions systematically, I present data analysis to clarify how 
ethnopolitical cleavage patterns measured by the degree of fragmentation and 
concentration of ethnopolitical groups independently and interactively with each 
other, as well as in additive and interactive combination with two sets of 
electoral institutions – the rules governing legislative elections and the rules 
governing presidential elections – affect the structure (fragmentation and 
concentration) of electoral and legislative party systems.  The analysis is based 
on systematic data on 55 electoral systems covering 99 elections to the lower 
house of the national legislature in 37 African countries. 
 
The paper is organised in four parts.  Part 1 clarifies a number of theoretical 
concerns and elaborates the notion of “embedded institution” as an analytically 
sound conceptualisation of the relationship between institutions and context and 
specifies how this relationship might affect political outcomes.  Part 2 describes 
the logic and method behind the specification of ethnopolitical groups and the 
construction of two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages, fragmentation and 
concentration.  Part 3 describes the research design. Part 4 presents the results of 
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the data analysis.  In the conclusion, I summarise the central findings and 





My analysis is based on a theoretical approach that attempts to resolve two 
analytical concerns involved in sorting out the relative impact of institutions and 
context on political outcomes: (1) the problem of endogeneity and (2) the 




1.1 “Separating the Dancer from the Dance” 
 
Systematic examination of the relative impact of institutions and context on 
political outcomes raises the vexing problem of endogeneity, for example, 
whether electoral institutions shape party systems, whether party systems 
reflecting the prevailing pattern of social cleavages shape electoral institutions, 
or whether party systems provide incentives to modify cleavages over time.  The 
problem lies at the heart of sociological critiques of Duverger’s institutional 
propositions (Cox 1997: 14-17) and persists in comparative institutional 
research more generally (Carey 2000: 751-755).  But it is not fatal.  Sociological 
critiques of Duverger that emphasise social cleavages as determinants of party 
systems are misconstrued because they mirror the monocausal determinism of 
institutional explanations they reject.  Nor are they uniformly supported by 
empirical evidence (Jones 1993; Lijphart 1994; Mainwaring 1991; Mozaffar 
1997, Rae 1971; Reynolds 1999).  In a brief but particularly innovative analysis 
of 16 democracies worldwide (circa 1990), Cox (1997: 20-23) directly tested the 
validity of sociological and institutional explanations by controlling for social 
diversity and examining the impact of different electoral formulas for lower and 
upper houses on the effective number of electoral and legislative parties in each 
chamber.  He found that differences in electoral formulas produced the expected 
differences in the party system independent of social structure. 
 
More generally, comparative research on the choice of new democratic 
institutions contains pragmatic solutions to the endogeneity problem.  These 
solutions turn on institutional choice as a coordination problem.  The central 
logic here is that institutional choice, even as it reflects a solution to political 
conflicts rooted in structurally determined power relations, is fundamentally 
about future political outcomes and is thus informed by political actors’ 
expectations and calculations about these outcomes.  Social structure, in other 
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words, constrains but does not determine the choice and design of new 
institutions.  Democratic transitions as moments of crises and major political 
change, moreover, tend to diminish the influence of standard constraints and 
heighten the salience and autonomy of agency in shaping institutional design.  
Also, the time and political capital that political actors invest in institutional 
bargaining are themselves crucial measures of the importance they attach to the 
prospective consequences of new institutions.  Finally, the sunk costs of 
institutional bargains underscore the uncertainty of renewed negotiations and, 
combined with the pervasiveness of coordination problems in political life, tend 
to reinforce the stickiness of new institutions (See, among others, Bawn 1993; 
Boix 1999; Carey 2000: 751-755; Colomer 2000; DiPalma 1990; Knight 1992; 
Luong 2000; McFaul 1999; Przeworski 1988; 1991; Remington and Smith 1996; 
Seely 2000; Waterbury 1997). 
 
The lesson here is that privileging either institutions or context in explanations 
of political outcomes is not a very helpful research strategy.  An alternative and, 
in my view, a more realistic and useful approach is to view electoral institutions 
as embedded in wider institutional frameworks and social settings (Bowler and 
Grofman 2000; Grofman, et al. 1999; Granovetter 1985).  This approach leaves 
open the question of whether electoral institutions have independent effects or 
whether those effects are contextually mediated.  The issue, in Grofman’s (1999: 




1.2 Institutions versus Context or Institutions and 
Context 
 
In arguably one of the few instances of cumulative theoretical development in 
comparative politics, an impressive body of works (Cox 1997; Duverger 1962; 
Lijphart 1990, 1994, 1999; Powell 1982, 2000; Rae 1971; Riker 1982; Sartori 
1976, 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 1989) offers powerful insights and 
incontrovertible evidence about how different electoral institutions facilitate the 
coordination strategies of voters, parties and candidates, aggregate the individual 
decisions of voters to shape party systems, structure opportunities for political 
representation, and affect the prospects for congruence between voter 
preferences and policy outcomes.  An equally impressive body of works with a 
venerable tradition in comparative sociology (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) suggests 
the importance of social structure in conditioning party systems.  While the 
theoretical mechanism linking social structure and party systems remains 
weakly specified in these works (Cox 1997: 19; Taagepera and Grofman 1985: 
343), the number and pattern of social cleavages clearly have some impact on 
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the structure of party systems.  Thus, plurality systems that typically produce 
two-party systems tend to produce multiparty systems if voters are 
geographically concentrated in above plurality proportions, as, for example, in 
India and Canada (Kim and Ohn 1992; Rae 1971; Riker 1982), while 
proportional representation (PR) systems that typically produce multiparty 
systems do so only in ethnically heterogeneous societies but not in ethnically 
homogeneous ones (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994). 
 
A number of works attempt to move beyond the “institution or context” debate 
and systematically sort out the independent and joint (additive and interactive) 
effects of institutions and social structure on party systems (Cox 1997; 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Powell 1982).2  Their findings show that while 
electoral institutions do have the theorised mechanical effects on the structure of 
party systems, contextual variables, measured especially by ethnic cleavages, 
exert a powerful mediating influence.  These works, however, (a) focus on the 
effects of ethnic heterogeneity based on ethnic groups classified by 
primoridialist logic, (b) conflate politically relevant and irrelevant ethnic groups 
and, therefore, do not distinguish politicised ethnic cleavage from those that are 
not politicised, (c) measure ethnic cleavages at only one level of inclusiveness 
and, therefore, do not capture politically relevant inter-group as well as intra-
group cleavages, and (d) do not examine the effect of ethnic concentration. 
 
My analysis draws on the theoretical insights of the larger comparative literature 
and specifically builds on the insights and findings of recent works, but extends 
them in several ways.  First, I emphasise the importance of an embedded 
institution approach as a useful way to sort out the independent and joint effects 
of institutions and context.  Second, I explicitly stress the role of ethnopolitical 
cleavages as alternative sources of information and strategic coordination that 
exist in a relationship of structured tension with institutions as sources of 
information and strategic coordination.  Third, I use a dataset that includes only 
ethnopolitical groups classified on the basis of constructivist logic (i.e., 
constructed and politicised ethnic groups).  Fourth, I measure ethnopolitical 
cleavages at three levels of inclusiveness to capture politically relevant inter-
group and intra-group cleavages.  And, fifth, I measure and utilise two 
dimensions of ethnopolitical cleavages, fragmentation and concentration. 
 
 
                                                     
2  For a very interesting analysis of the individual and joint effects of cleavage structures and 
electoral institutions on legislative party fragmentation in subnational governments, in this 
case, the Swiss cantons, see Vatter (2003) 
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1.3 Embedded Institution 
 
The central logic of the embedded institution approach is that electoral 
institutions are embedded in a wider context that is typically comprised of the 
overall institutional framework of governance and social setting (Grofman 1999: 
xi).  The obvious intuition here is that similar institutions are likely to produce 
different outcomes in different contexts.  While the intuition behind the 
approach may be obvious, perhaps even trivial, the analytical implications are 
not.  An embedded institution approach avoids the conceptually misconstrued 
debate over privileging institutions and context with mutually exclusive causal 
precedence in explanations of political outcomes.  By conceptually situating 
electoral institutions in context, it facilitates systematic analysis and empirical 
validation of the separate and joint institutional and contextual variables. 
 
In particular, by facilitating systematic analysis of how electoral institutions and 
ethnopolitical cleavages shape party systems, it enables discovery of variations 
in structure of party systems due to combined variations in design of electoral 
institutions and the patterns of ethnopolitical cleavages.  Electoral institutions 
and ethnopolitical cleavages matter in structuring party systems because they 
each inform and shape the mutual expectations of voters and candidates about 
winning and losing, thus facilitating their strategic coordination over votes and 
seats.  However, the information and incentives that each variable contains and 
conveys may not necessarily be consistent; indeed, they may be profoundly at 
odds with each other.  This may explain why Duverger outcomes in many new 
democracies often do not materialise in expected ways (Filippov, Ordeshook, 
and Shvetsova 1999; Moser 1999, 2001; Mozaffar 1997, 1998).  That expected 
institutional outcomes do not occur, however, is not necessarily an indication of 
the failure of electoral institutions to behave in expected ways.  An alternative, 
and not entirely unrelated, explanation might be that contextual variables 
provide more relevant information and incentives for voters and candidates that 
modify the impact of electoral institutions.  It is useful, therefore, to sort out this 
relationship of structured tension between electoral institutions and 
ethnopolitical cleavages by carefully specifying and examining their 
independent, additive and interactive effects on party systems.  The notion of 
embedded institution enables this specification. 
 
 
1.4 Institutions, Cleavages and Strategic 
Coordination 
 
The strategic coordination role of electoral institution is now well established 
(Cox 1997, Duverger 1962; Jones 1993; Katz 1997; Lijphart 1990, 1994, 1999; 
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Powell 1982, 2000; Rae 1971; Riker 1982; Sartori 1976, 1994; Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989).  Cox’s (1997) definitive work on the subject clarifies the 
motivating logic: (a) candidates wish to economise on their resources and voters 
wish to economise on their votes and (b) their expectations of winning and 
losing tend to be mutually reinforcing.  Electoral institutions, principally district 
magnitude, structure these two micro-processes to obtain Duverger outcomes, in 
most cases.  Non-Duverger outcomes do occur, however, due to the mitigating 
effects of social structure, as, for instance, in Canada and India, where regional 
parties rely on the support of geographically concentrated blocs of voters to 
overcome the standard institutional constraints on the winning potential of 
smaller parties.  I will show below that in African countries, as well, the 
geographical concentration of ethnopolitical groups also tend to condition 
Duverger outcomes, but in a different way. 
 
The role of electoral institutions in strategic coordination is premised on 
political actors’ mutual knowledge and understanding of the incentives and 
information these institutions convey.  Such knowledge and understanding 
facilitate communication among voters and candidates and reinforce their 
mutual expectations about the prospects of winning and losing.  In emerging 
democracies, however, electoral institutions are new and their incentives and 
outcomes not well known or understood by political actors, who compensate for 
the resulting information deficit by relying on alternative sources of information 
and coordination.  In Africa, ethnopolitical cleavages are these alternative 
sources. 
 
The role of ethnopolitical cleavages in facilitating strategic coordination is best 
understood if ethnicity as a definition of individual and group identity is viewed 
as a strategic resource that efficiently solves collective action problems and is 
strategically (not reflexively) activated to define group interests and organise 
group action in response to institutional incentives for doing so in the 
competition for power and resources.  Ethnicity, ethnic identities and 
ethnopolitical groups, in other words, are not primordially fixed.  They are fluid 
and constructed, engendering variability in both the number of potential groups 
with which individuals can identify and the ethnopolitical demography resulting 
from shifting group membership (Brass 1991; Chandra 2001; Fearon and Laitin 
1996, 2000; Hardin 1995; Mozaffar 1995, 2001). 
 
In Africa, colonial institutions defined the initial political conditions for the 
construction of ethnopolitical identities as bases of group organisation and 
political mobilisation (Coleman 1958; Laitin 1986; Posner 1999; Vail 1989).  
Varying post-colonial authoritarian and democratic regimes that structured the 
political struggle for power and resources reinforced the incentives for ethnic-
based definition of group interests and resulting ethnopolitical action.  In most 
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African countries, moreover, the general absence or weakness of alternative bases 
of political organisation, such as class, increases the comparative advantage of 
ethnicity in forging and sustaining group solidarity through the provision of access 
to state resources by ethnic leaders in exchange for the political support of ethnic 
followers and in motivating incipient class formation mediated by the central role 
of the state in economic management.  For risk-averse leaders, moreover, the 
uncertainty of political competition makes ethnicity a valuable social capital for 
demonstrating political power vis-à-vis the state and other similarly constituted 
groups and in maintaining access to land, labour and food in the context of 
economic decline and diminishing state resources (See, among others, Bates 
1989, 1990, 1999; Berry 1993; Ensminger 1992; Posner 1999; Mozaffar and 
Scarritt 1999: 242-243; Rothchild 1997; Rothchild and Olorunsola 1983; 
Scarritt, McMillan and Mozaffar 2001; Sklar 1979). 
 
The extent to which ethnicity facilitates strategic coordination among voters and 
candidates to shape party systems depends a great deal on patterns of 
ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnopolitical concentration.  Analysts have 
conventionally posited an isomorphic relationship between patterns of 
ethnopolitical cleavages and the structure of party systems on the assumption 
that each ethnopolitical group is sufficiently large and cohesive to support a 
party by itself.  Thus, ceteris paribus, high ethnopolitical fragmentation 
produces a dispersed party system and low ethnopolitical fragmentation a 
concentrated one (Cox 1997: Ch. 11; Lijphart 1977; Reynolds 2000; Ordeshook 
and Shvetsova 1994).3  In Africa, however, the nature of constructed 
ethnopolitical groups and the resulting social cleavages, as described in the next 
section, reveal a complex group morphology that seriously militates against such 
a reflexive relationship between ethnopolitical cleavages and party systems, 
even though it is somewhat counteracted by a high degree of geographical 
concentration (Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999: 235-243; 2002; Mozaffar, Scarritt 
and Galaich 2003; Scarritt 1993; Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999).  In most African 
countries, if each ethnopolitical group voted for its own party, the prevalence of 
large numbers of such groups is likely to produce such a high degree of vote 
dispersion among large numbers of small parties that none is likely to secure 
enough votes to win seats.  High ethnopolitical fragmentation, in other words, is 
likely to constrict rather expand party system.  The geographical concentration 
of ethnopolitical groups and the institutional design of electoral systems can 
mitigate this restrictive effect.  Geographical concentration by itself, however, is 
unlikely to overcome the restrictive effect of high fragmentation due to the 
                                                     
3The intellectual origin of this assumption can be traced to political sociology and its 
emphasis on social cleavages (class, religion, region) as reflexive definitions of group interest 
and automatic bases of group action. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) remains the classic statement. 
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presence of large numbers of small ethnopolitical groups.  Systems with low 
fragmentation, on the other hand, usually feature a small number of large 
ethnopolitical groups that are also likely to have dispersed populations and 
therefore unlikely to need concentrated voters to sustain a small number of 
parties corresponding to the small number of ethnopolitical cleavages.  These 
variations in the configurations of ethnopolitical cleavages suggest the 
likelihood that ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnopolitical concentration will 
interact to shape the structure of party systems. 
 
The magnitude of this effect will depend on district magnitude and the proximity 
of presidential and legislative elections.  There is now wide agreement in the 
comparative literature that district magnitude is the critical institutional variable 
affecting the party system (Cox 1997; Lijphart 19994; Rae 1971; Taagepera and 
Shugart; 1989: ch. 11).4  District magnitude shapes party systems by setting a 
minimum threshold of votes required to win one seat (or, conversely, the 
maximum number of votes a party can secure without winning a seat) and thus 
influencing the proportionality between votes and seats.  Ceteris paribus, small 
districts set high thresholds that increase vote-seat disproportionality and 
encourage concentrated party systems, while large districts set low thresholds that 
reduce vote-seat disproportionality and encourage fragmented party systems. 
 
Comparative scholarship also emphasises the importance of presidential election 
rules, specifically the electoral formula for presidential elections and the 
proximity of legislative and presidential elections, in shaping party systems 
(Cox 1997: 187-190, 203-221; Jones 1994, 1995; Mainwaring 1993; Mozaffar 
and Vengroff, 2002; Powell, 1982; Shugart and Carey 1992).  This has special 
resonance in Africa where, with the exception of Lesotho and South Africa, new 
democracies have uniformly adopted presidential systems.5  Presidential 
elections in Africa are important for several reasons.  First, with the presidency 
as the top prize in the political game, they attract a large number of candidates, 
few of whom have any realistic chance of winning.  Characteristic problems of 
post-authoritarian democracies – limited experience with competitive elections, 
information deficit about the extent of electoral support, plus personal ambition 
                                                     
4Other institutional dimensions of electoral systems that have also been found to affect party 
systems include the electoral formula, mathematical threshold (inversely related to district 
magnitude), the size of legislative assembly, and the ballot structure (Lijphart 1994: 10-14). 
   
5Botswana and Mauritius, Africa’s longest-standing democracies, have always been 
parliamentary systems.  Gambia remained a parliamentary democracy for 17 years before 
shifting to a presidential democracy in 1983, the only African country to do so.  All other 
African countries gained independence from colonial rule in the 1960s with democratically 
elected parliamentary governments that were soon replaced by military or single-party civilian 
regimes, many of which later established presidential governments.  
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– prevent opposition candidates from coordinating on a single candidate to 
oppose the erstwhile authoritarian rulers who now compete as presidential 
candidates armed with the standard advantages of incumbency.  Second, an 
important strategic reason for the entry of large numbers of contenders in 
presidential elections is that African presidents possess substantial resources for 
patronage.  Presidential contenders with weak winning potential often expect to 
demonstrate sufficient electoral support to bargain entry in post-election 
coalitions and secure state resources for their constituencies in return for 
political support of the winners.  Third, for leading presidential candidates and 
winners, such bargaining resources possessed by weaker candidates are also 
strategically important because of the salience of ethnopolitical groups for 
electoral support.  Just as it constrains legislative candidates, the combination of 
ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration constrains leading presidential 
candidates from securing outright electoral majorities.  And since the weaker 
candidates usually control small but cohesive blocks of votes, leading 
presidential contenders have strong incentives to form minimum-winning 
coalitions with them to ensure an electoral victory and a governing majority. 
 
The extent to which strong and weak presidential contenders are able to 
negotiate minimum-winning coalitions will depend, in addition to ethnopolitical 
cleavages, on the rules of presidential elections.  Most African countries have 
adopted majority runoff formulas that are particularly conducive to forming such 
coalitions.  However, 58 out of the 69 presidential elections held under majority 
runoff rules in Africa since 1990, only 17 have been decided in the second 
round.  This suggests that two other dimensions of presidential elections rules 
play a more important role in shaping party systems: (1) the proximity of 
presidential and legislative elections, and (2) the effective number of 
presidential candidates (Cox 1997: 209-213). 
 
To summarise, the theoretical concerns discussed in this section suggest three 
things.  First, the embedded institution approach offers a solution to the 
endogeneity problem that bedevils attempts to examine the effects of institutions 
and context on political outcomes.  Second, the approach usefully situates 
electoral institutions in wider institutional frameworks (e.g. presidential 
systems) and social contexts (e.g. ethnopolitical cleavages), thus highlighting the 
importance of examining the independent and joint (additive and interactive) 
effects of electoral institutions and contextual variables on party systems.  Third, 
comparative scholarship and empirical observation suggest that the following 
variables are the crucial ones in shaping the structure of electoral and legislative 
party systems: (a) district magnitude; presidential election rules related to (b) the 
proximity of presidential and legislative elections and (c) the effective number 
of presidential candidates; and ethnopolitical cleavages measured by the degree 
of (d) ethnopolitical group fragmentation and (e) ethnopolitical group 
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concentration.  Before describing the operationalisation of these variables, I 
clarify the constructivist specification of ethnopolitical groups and the 
measurement of resulting ethnopolitical cleavages in the next section. 
 
 
2. The Constructivist Specification of 
Ethnopolitical Groups and Cleavages6 
 
The logic of constructivism turns on the notion that individuals have multiple 
ethnic identities that are constructed in the course of social, economic and 
political interactions.  This malleability of ethnic identities derives (a) from the 
multiplicity of objective ethnic markers (language, religion, race, caste, “tribe,” 
territory, etc.) that may be invoked to define and distinguish ethnic groups, (b) 
from the relative complexity of these markers that may foster intra-group 
divisions combined with inter-group differences (e.g. sectarian divisions in a 
religion, “tribal” differences among same language speakers or subjects of the 
same kingdom), and (c) from temporal changes in the relevance of these 
composite markers and their components in defining and distinguishing ethnic 
groups as well as in the politicisation of resulting inter-group and intra-group 
cleavages (Chandra 2001, 7-8; Laitin and Posner 2001, 13-16). 
 
Intrinsic to the logic of constructivism are three specific processes that motivate 
the criteria for specifying the ethnopolitical groups and the cleavages among 
them that we include in our analysis: construction, politicisation and 
particisation.  The construction of ethnic groups and cleavages is not detailed 
here, but its salient features are highlighted because it is a necessary 
precondition for the politicisation of ethnic groups, that is, the construction of 
ethnic groups into ethnopolitical groups.  Like other social cleavages, however, 
not all ethnic cleavages become politicised, and even fewer become “particized, 
that is, made into important lines of partisan division” (Cox 1997, 26, original 
emphasis).  I describe below how this crucial distinction between particisation 
and other forms of politicisation of ethnic cleavages helps to solve the problem 
of endogeneity that is ostensibly inherent in measuring ethnopolitical cleavages 
in accounts of variations in the number of electoral and legislative parties. 
 
An ethnic group is constructed when individuals in culturally plural societies 
self-consciously choose one or more objective ethnic markers to distinguish in-
groups from out-groups.  In Africa, as elsewhere, the individuals’ choice of 
ethnic markers and the consequent size of the constructed ethnic groups are 
constrained by the variety, complexity, and prior use of such markers, the 
                                                     
6 This section draws heavily on Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich (2003). 
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associated cost of forming new groups and sustaining group solidarity, and the 
institutional framework of governance defined by the state.  Increased variety 
and complexity of ethnic markers expand opportunities for ethnic group 
construction, but also constrain unfettered construction of especially large and 
cohesive ethnic groups because of (a) the high start-up cost of group formation 
associated with the incorporation of competing groups and interests defined by 
varied ethnic markers to construct larger and more encompassing ethnic groups 
and (b) the high cost of sustaining group solidarity in the face of the varied 
markers serving as competing sources of group definition within the larger 
constructed agglomerations.  These structural and strategic factors thus limit the 
size and the cohesion of ethnic groups that can be constructed and mobilised for 
collective political action. 
 
In Africa, colonial rule and postcolonial regimes reinforced these constraints by 
structuring the variety and complexity of ethnic markers and politicising some 
of them.  Colonial rulers’ reliance on local agents to cope with the dilemma of 
maintaining control at low cost encouraged these agents to differentiate their 
groups from those not so privileged by colonial authority either by recombining 
and redefining existing objective markers of ethnicity or by accentuating 
previously minor group differences (Vail 1989).  Colonial rulers’ creation of 
administrative units to secure additional economies in the cost of governance 
incorporated culturally disparate groups within single administrative units or 
separated culturally similar groups into separate units.  Occasionally, 
administrative encapsulation enabled the combination and redefinition of 
different ethnic markers for the construction of larger, territorially concentrated 
and, hence, also cohesive ethnopolitical groups.  In other instances, colonial 
rulers privileged one ethnic marker (e.g. ancestral village) to foster spatially 
distributed, hence fragmented, groups over another (e.g. religion) that could 
foster larger and more encompassing groups (Laitin 1986).  In these different 
ways, colonial rule emphasised the relevance of a wide range of diffuse and 
heterogeneous criteria of group formation, thereby increasing instead of 
decreasing the variety and complexity of objective ethnic markers that 
constrained the construction and politicisation of large and cohesive ethnic 
groups in Africa’s culturally plural societies. 
 
At independence, therefore, African countries inherited a distinctive ethnic 
morphology with three defining features that are reflected in the structure of 
constructed ethnopolitical groups and that have shaped the pattern of their 
political interactions: (1) marked differences in group size, such that virtually no 
major ethnopolitical group comprises an outright majority in a country, although 
some comprise a large plurality, (2) considerable variety and complexity in 
ethnic markers, such that, even as they produce politically salient inter-ethnic 
differences, they also produce politically salient intra-group heterogeneity but 
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limited cultural differences among large agglomerations of such groups, and (3) 
the territorial concentration of some ethnic groups that facilitates their 
construction as large and cohesive units for collective political action.  These 
three features have combined with the accommodation by postcolonial regimes 
of instrumental (“pork-barrel”) ethnopolitical demands to foster communal 
contention as the typical pattern of political interactions in which ethnopolitical 
groups serve as cost-effective strategic resources for organising political 
competition for power and resources.  Communal contention, however, 
underscores the high start-up cost of new group formation and the high 
maintenance cost of group solidarity, thus discouraging political entrepreneurs 
from exaggerating cultural differences among groups and encouraging them 
instead to maintain strong group identities, including some coexisting sub-group 
identities, that are strategically sustained by their ability to access the state and 
secure valued goods and services for their followers (Mozaffar and Scarritt 
1999, 239-242). 
 
The constructivist processes highlighted above motivate five criteria for 
specifying ethnopolitical groups and cleavages.  The first, which derives from 
the distinction between the construction, politicisation and particisation of ethnic 
groups and helps to avoid the endogeneity problem noted above, involves 
specifying only those groups that have demonstrated their actual political 
relevance or high potential political relevance based on past relevance, apart 
from or prior to particisation.  Thus, the decision rule employed was that the 
incidence of at least one of the following forms of long-standing politicisation 
other than particisation would serve as a necessary and sufficient indicator of the 
construction of ethnopolitical groups: (a) organised group mobilisation unrelated 
to party formation (primarily in ethnic associations or cliques of leaders within 
the same party, the bureaucracy or the military); (b) articulation of grievances by 
leaders claiming to speak for a group rather than a party; (c) participation in 
collective action or (violent or nonviolent) conflict with other groups or the state 
and being subjected to state violence; (d) encapsulation within or domination of 
an officially designated administrative unit; (e) occupying a disproportionate 
number of high positions in the bureaucracy or the military; and (f) controlling 
disproportionate socioeconomic resources. 
 
The second criterion involves specifying all ethnopolitical groups, even at the 
risk of being overly inclusive.  Thus the decision rule deliberately defines forms 
of non-party politicisation broadly.  Furthermore, the extensive secondary 
Africanist literature in history, anthropology, sociology and political science was 
carefully examined to assess the demonstrated and potential political relevance 
of a wide range of ethnic groups and to draw up a list of ethnopolitical groups 
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included in the dataset.7  The third criterion involves specifying ethnopolitical 
groups at three levels of inclusiveness in order to capture all cleavages that may 
affect variations in party system structure, including national dichotomous 
cleavages between top level groups (which are found in twelve countries), as 
well as a variety of more complex multiethnic ones usually involving both 
middle level groups (within or independent of top level groups) and lower level 
groups within them.  Tables 1-3 display data on Nigeria, Zambia and Rwanda 
and Burundi, respectively, as illustrations of the three types of inter-group and 
intra-group cleavage structures that prevail in contemporary Africa.  Nigeria, for 
instance, has all three levels of cleavages, the pattern found in only twelve 
African countries.  Zambia has two levels of cleavages, the dominant pattern in 
Africa.  Rwanda and Burundi have one level each, whereby the whole country is 
divided into two rigid and internally cohesive nationally dichotomous groups, a 
pattern found in only two other countries (Comoros and Djibouti). 
 
The fourth criterion involves specifying the geographic concentration of 
ethnopolitical groups and sub-groups. As noted above, territorial concentration 
facilitates ethnopolitical group construction by furnishing a critical mass of 
individuals with similar interests based on a common location, thus reducing the 
start-up cost of group formation and the maintenance cost of group solidarity.  
The final criterion concerns specifying the time frame for the cleavages that I 
analyse.  Thus, to be included in our dataset, ethnic groups must have been 
politicised at least ten years prior to the first election analysed in each country, 
which helps to avoid the problem of endogeneity, and the most recent evidence 
of their politicisation must be no more than twenty years prior to this election, 
which helps to establish their continued, and potential for future, politicisation.8  
These five criteria led to the specification of 264 ethnopolitical groups and sub-
groups at three levels of inclusiveness.  These 264 groups are the basis for the 
two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages, fragmentation and concentration, 
employed in the data analysis. 
 
                                                     
7 In case of ambiguity in the secondary literature, my collaborator and I relied on our best 
judgments, based on our knowledge and expertise, to assess demonstrated political relevance 
of specified groups. 
8An exception was made to the ten-year rule for inclusion in the case of politicisation of 
groups through violence because this is so clearly independent of particisation.  For example, 
ethnic associations which were instrumental in politicising the Yorubas and the Ibos in 
Nigeria were founded in the 1920s and 1930s and have continued to be active within the last 
twenty years, while the politicisation of the Ogoni and other “oil minorities” in that country 
occurred only a little more than ten years prior to the 1999 election and involved considerable 
violence.  
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Table 1. Ethnopolitical Cleavage Patterns in Nigeria* 
 
Ethnopolitical Groups (%) Concentration Codes 
NORTH (50.00%) 
Hausa-Fulani (31.56) 
Sokoto coalition (14.00) 
Kano coalition (13.5) 
Bororo (1.55) 

















































Fragmentation Index = 2.00 
Fragmentation Index = 4.96 
Total Fragmentation Index =12.01 
Concentration Index = 3.00 
Concentration Index = 2.20 
Total Concentration Index  = 2.74 
Notes:   
Population percentages are in parentheses. 
* Bold: first level of inclusiveness.   
Underline: second level of inclusiveness. 
Italics: third level of inclusiveness.   
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Table 2.  Ethnopolitical Cleavage Patterns in Zambia* 
 
Ethnopolitical Groups (%) Concentration Codes 
 



































Fragmentation Index = 3.65 
Total Fragmentation Index = 7.14 
Concentration Index = 1.82 
Total Concentration Index = 2.39 
Notes:   
Population percentages are in parentheses 
* Underline: second level of inclusiveness. 
Italics: third level of inclusiveness.   
 
Table 3.  Ethnopolitical Cleavage Patterns in Burundi and Rwanda* 
 












Total Fragmentation Index = 1.22 
 0 
0 
Total Concentration Index = 0 
Notes:    
Population percentages are in parentheses. 
* Bold = first level of inclusiveness.   
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3. Research Design 
 
The unit of analysis is the electoral system defined as the set of “essentially 
unchanged election rules under which one or more elections are conducted” 
(Lijphart 1994: 7).  The premise here is that elections “held under the same 
electoral system are regarded as repeated observations of the operation of a 
single electoral system” (Lijphart 1994: 7).  The rules define a number of 
dimensions of an electoral system, key among which are electoral formula 
governing legislative elections, the electoral formula governing presidential 
elections, district magnitude and assembly size.  I used a change in one of these 
dimensions as a measure of change in the electoral system.  Since an electoral 
formula is a discrete variable, a change in it was easily measured.  Thus among 
the 37 countries included in the analysis, only two countries changed their 
electoral formulas for legislative elections: Madagascar, which changed from a 
straight PR-formula to a mixed parallel system combining plurality formula in 
single-member districts and PR formula in multimember districts; and Lesotho, 
which changed from a plurality formula in single-member districts to the only 
compensatory mixed-member proportional system in Africa (Elklit 2002; 
Mozaffar 2003).   
 
To limit arbitrary increases in the number of cases due to changes in the other 
two electoral system dimensions, both of which are interval variables, I adapted 
Lijphart’s (1994: 13) rule of thumb of a 20% change to establish a change of 15-
20% as the measure of a shift from an old to a new electoral system.  This 
strategy produced 55 electoral systems in 99 elections to the lower house of the 
national legislature in 37 countries.  The data analysis below is thus based on 
N=55 cases.  Table 4 displays these data.  While the countries in the table are 
identified by their official names, multiple electoral systems for each country are 
identified by a corresponding number after the country name followed by the 
number of elections held under that system and the years of those elections.  For 
instance, Botswana has two electoral systems, “botswana1” covering six 




3.1 Variable Operationalisations 
 
Party Systems.  The structure (i.e., the degree of fragmentation and 
concentration) of the party system is the dependent variable.  I focus specifically 
on the electoral and legislative party systems, measured, respectively, by the 
number of parties winning votes and the number of parties wining seats.  I 
employ the widely used indices developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1989) to 
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operationalise both measures: the Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) 
and the Effective Number of Legislative Parties (ENLP). 
 









Angola angola 1: 1992 Madagascar madgas1 1: 1993 
Benin benin1 1: 1991  madgas2 1: 2002 
 benin2 1: 1995 Malawi malawi 2: 1994-1999 
 benin3 1: 1999 Mali mali1 1: 1992 
Botswana botswana1 6: 1965-1989  mali2 1: 1997 
 botswana2 2: 1994-1999 Mauritania mauritan 2: 1992-1996 
Burkina Faso burkfaso1 1: 1992 Mauritius maurtius 8: 1967-2000 
 burkfaso2 1: 1997 Mozambique mozambiq 2: 1994-1999 
 burkfaso3 1: 2002 Namibia namibia 3: 1989-1999 
Burundi burundi 1: 1993 Niger niger 2: 1993-1995 
Cameroon cameroon 2: 1992-1997 Nigeria nigeria 2: 1999-2003 
Cape Verde capverde1 1: 1991 Sao Tome et 
Principe 
saotome 4: 1991-2002 
 capverde2 2: 1992-2001 Senegal senegal1 2: 1983-1988 
Chad chad 1: 1997  senegal2 1: 1993 
Comoros comoros 1: 1992  senegal3 1: 1998 
Congo congo 1: 1993  senegal4 1: 2001 
Cote d'Ivoire codivoir 1: 1990 Seychelles seychell 3: 1992-2002 
Djibouti djibouti 2: 1992-1997 Sierra Leone sleone1 1: 1996 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
eqguinea 2: 1993-1999  sleone2 1:2002 
Gambia gambia1 3: 1966-1977 South Africa soafrica 2: 1994-1999 
 gambia2 3: 1982-1992 Tanzania tanzania 2: 1995-2000 
 gambia3 1: 1997 Zambia zambia 3: 1991-2001 
Ghana ghana 3: 1992-2000 Zimbabwe zimbabw1 1: 1980 
Guinea guinea 2: 1995-2002  zimbabw2 1: 1985 
Guinea-
Bissau 
gbissau 1: 1994  zimbabw3 2: 1990-1995 
Kenya kenya 3: 1992-2002    
Lesotho lesotho1 1: 1993 Countries  N = 37  
 lesotho2 1: 1998 Electoral 
Systems 
N = 55  
 lesotho3 1: 2002 Number of 
Elections 
N = 99  
Liberia liberia 1: 1997    
 
Electoral Institutions.  There is now wide consensus that District Magnitude is 
the critical institutional variable that shapes the structure of party systems.   
Because countries with proportional representation formulas for converting 
votes into seats have multiple districts of varying size, I follow Lijphart (1994) 
and utilise average district magnitude as the summary measure for district 
magnitude.   Also, because of the potential curvilinear relationship between 
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district magnitude and the number of parties (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, 
106-107), the natural log of district magnitude is used in the data analysis.9 
 
The Proximity of Legislative and Presidential Elections is also an important 
institutional variable that shapes the structure of party systems.  I utilise Cox’s 
(1997, 209-13) formula to operationalise this variable.  Cox extends the insights 
of the comparative literature on the reductive effects of presidential elections on 
the number of parties (Shugart and Carey 1992) with a more refined interval 
measure of the degree of proximity between legislative and elections, instead of 
the standard nominal measure of the two elections as concurrent or separate.  
Proximity is a matter of degree and ranges from maximal proximity (concurrent 
elections) to zero proximity when legislative elections are held at the 
presidential mid-term.  Between these extremes, as proximity increases, 
presidential elections tend to reduce the number of electoral and legislative 
parties.  The magnitude of this effect depends on the degree of fractionalisation 
of presidential elections as measured by the effective number of presidential 
candidates (Cox 1997, 211-13).  I, therefore, also examine the interaction of the 
proximity of presidential and legislative elections with the effective number of 
presidential candidates, Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections X 
Effective Number of Presidential Candidates. 
 
Constructed Ethnopolitical Cleavages: Fragmentation and Concentration.  
I use two indices to operationalise the two dimensions of constructed 
ethnopolitical cleavages, fragmentation and concentration.  The Ethnopolitical 
Group Fragmentation index is based on the population share of each 
ethnopolitical group or sub-group.  As the illustrative examples in Tables 1-3 
show, most African countries have different fragmentation scores derived from 
these population shares, depending on which of the three levels of inclusiveness 
is used to calculate the index.  For some countries, these differences will range 
from very low to very high fragmentation.  A strict application of constructivist 
logic might require calculating fragmentation at the level having greatest 
relevance at the time of a given election, but that would be almost impossible to 
do and would increase the danger of endogeneity.  Therefore, I use the index of 
total fragmentation in our analysis.  This index combines all three levels of 
inclusiveness by including all undivided top and middle level groups and all 
lowest level groups.  In other words, total fragmentation includes all groups that 
are potentially politically relevant at the national level.  I thus relate the greatest 
possible nationally relevant ethnopolitical fragmentation as identified in our 
dataset to variations in the structure of the party system, which makes theoretical 
                                                     
9For other measures of district magnitude, see Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 126-141, 264-
269. 
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sense since parties can appeal to groups at any of the three levels of 
inclusiveness. 
 
Table 5.  Variable Description and Operationalisation 
Variable Description Operationalisation 
Effective Number of 
Electoral Parties 
1/∑vi2, where vi is party i’s vote share 
 
Effective Number of 
Legislative Parties 
1/∑si2, where si is party i’s seat share 















where Lt is the legislative election, Pt-1 is the previous 
presidential election, and (Pt-1 - Pt+1) is the presidential 
term (Cox 1997, 210) 
Effective Number of 
Presidential Candidates 




1/∑gi2, where gi is the ethnopolitical group g’s share of 
the country’s population 
Ethnopolitical Group 
Concentration Index 
∑(gi*ci), where gi is an ethnopolitical group’s population 
share and ci  is its concentration code (0=widely 
dispersed, 1=primarily urban or minority in one region, 
2=majority in one region, 3=concentrated in one region). 
 
The Ethnopolitical Group Concentration index is based on concentration codes 
adapted from the Minorities at Risk (Phase III) dataset: 0 = widely dispersed, 1 
= primarily urban or minority in one region, 2 = majority in one region, 
dispersed in others, and 3 = concentrated in one region (Gurr 1993).  The index 
for each group is calculated by multiplying its concentration code by its share of 
the ethnopolitically relevant population in the country, with the results for all 
groups summed to obtain the ethnopolitical group concentration score for the 
country.  Because I wish to examine whether fragmentation and concentration 
have independent or joint effects on the number of parties, I include an 
interaction term reflecting their product in the analysis, Ethnopolitical Group 
Fragmentation X Ethnopolitical Group Concentration.  Table 5 displays the 
information on the variables and their operationalisation. 
 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
 
I employ OLS regression to test eight specifications, four each for Effective 
Number of Electoral Parties and Effective Number of Legislative Parties.  
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Model 1 is an institutional specification that includes variables measuring 
legislative electoral institutions (District Magnitude) and two aspects of 
presidential elections, the Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections 
and the interaction between the Proximity of Presidential and Legislative 
Elections and the Effective Number of Presidential Candidates.  Model 2 is a 
sociological specification that tests for the independent effects of Ethnopolitical 
Group Fragmentation and Ethnopolitical Group Concentration as well as their 
interactive effects (Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation X Ethnopolitical Group 
Concentration).  Model 3 is an additive specification in which all six variables in 
the previous two models are entered in the equation.  Model 4 is an 
additive/interactive specification and hence a fully specified model.  It includes 
five variables in Model 3 but replaces the interaction of the two measures of 
ethnopolitical cleavages in that model with an interaction term reflecting the 
product of district magnitude and the two measures of ethnopolitical cleavages 






Tables 6 and 7 display the results of the OLS regression for the Effective 
Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) and the Effective Number of Legislative 
Parties (ENLP), respectively.  The results generally confirm theoretical 
expectation about the independent and joint effects of electoral institutions and 
ethnopolitical cleavages variations in the structure of party systems in African 
democracies.  All four models for each dependent variable are statistically 
significant and the independent variables are correctly signed.  The institutional 
model is statistically significant but the coefficient is unimpressive in accounting 
for only 15% percent of the variance in ENEP and slightly more impressive in 
accounting for 22% of the variance in ENLP.  In the sociological Model 2, 
however, ethnopolitical cleavages explain 30% of the variance in ENEP and 
40% of the variance in ENLP, an increase of 15% and 18%, respectively, over 
the institutional model.  The additive and interactive model account for 
progressively increasing amount of variance in ENEP, 39% and 42 %, 
respectively.  The additive model accounts for 58% of variance in ENLP, while 
the interactive model accounts for a slightly lesser amount of variance at 55% in 
ENLP.  Both the additive and interactive model, however, reflects the continued 
mediating effects of ethnopolitical cleavages. 
 
                                                     
10See Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan (1990, especially 40-42) for the motivating logic for the three-
way interaction of independent variables. 
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Table 6.  Determinants of Effective Number of Electoral Parties 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
















Proximity of Presidential and 
Legislative Elections X 



































District Magnitude X 
Ethnopolitical Group 
Fragmentation X Ethnopolitical 
Group Concentration  


























Notes:  Entries are standardised coefficients.  Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. 
*≤.05; **≤.01; ***≤ .001 
 
Overall, these results confirm the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in 
structuring the strategic coordination among voters and candidates and in 
mediating the effects of electoral institutions on the structure of party systems in 
Africa’s emerging democracies.  Examination of the effects of individual 
clusters of variables provides additional confirmation.  Models 2 and 3 confirm 
the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in shaping the structure of party 
systems, both independently and interactively.  Ethnopolitical fragmentation 
independently reduces the number of electoral and legislative parties in both 
models.11   
 
                                                     
11I ran a separate equation without the interaction term to confirm the independent effects of 
ethnopolitical fragmentation.  I do not report the results to save space. 
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Table 7.  Determinants of Effective Number of Legislative Parties 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
















Proximity of Presidential and 
Legislative Elections X Effective 




















Ethnopolitical Group Fragmentation X 







District Magnitude X Ethnopolitical 
Group Fragmentation X Ethnopolitical 
Group Concentration 

























Notes:  Entries are standardised coefficients.  Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. 
*≤.05; **≤.01; ***≤ .001 
 
This reductive effect, which stems from the distinctive morphology of African 
ethnopolitical groups noted above, suggests that an increased number of group 
cleavages encourages candidates to forge inter-group alliances to improve on 
their electoral gains.  Such alliances, while improving the prospect of group 
cooperation, also tend to reduce the number of electoral and legislative parties.  
Ethnopolitical concentration, however, counteracts this reductive effect of 
fragmentation.  For example, when group concentration is high at 2.47, group 
fragmentation tends to increase the effective number of electoral parties by .04 
and the effective number of legislative parties by .02.  Correspondingly, when 
group concentration is low at .57, group fragmentation tends to reduce the 
effective number of electoral parties by -.06 and the effective number of 
legislative seats by -.01.12  This counteracting influence of ethnopolitical 
                                                     
12I derived these conditional effects of fragmentation on the number of electoral and 
legislative parties by entering the value of one standard deviation of the concentration index 
  24  
concentration on ethnopolitical fragmentation remains even with the addition of 
institutional variables in Model 3. 
 
These important results can be explained by the role of group concentration in 
reducing the transaction costs of forging and sustaining group solidarity.  
Scholars of social movements (Tarrow 1994) have found, for instance, that 
unmediated communication of ideas, strategies and resources is crucial for 
reducing the collective action costs of group cohesion.  The effectiveness of 
such communication derives from the face-to-face interaction in small groups 
that typically constitute the larger social movements as loosely linked “congeries 
of social networks” (Tarrow 1994, 22).  African ethnopolitical groups are not 
social movements, but their morphologies are conceptually similar.  As 
described above, the combinations of cleavages among and within groups that 
typically characterise African ethnopolitical groups diminish the effectiveness of 
strategic face-to-face interaction in forging groups that are sufficiently large and 
cohesive to sustain political parties of their own.  Group concentration, however, 
helps to overcome this constraint. The physical proximity engendered by group 
concentration facilitates the strategic face-to-face interaction of small groups, 
which helps to solidify the otherwise loose links among the sub-groups.  The 
associated affinity of place, moreover, helps to define the common interests of 
the emergent, spatially anchored larger group in electoral competition with 
similarly constructed groups.  This process is the key to the interactive effect of 
ethnopolitical group fragmentation and concentration on increasing the number 
of electoral and legislative parties in Africa’s emerging democracies.  And this 
effect occurs with or without the effect of electoral institutions. 
 
The variables related to presidential elections consistently demonstrate the 
substantial effect of the Proximity of Presidential and Legislative Elections in 
reducing the number of electoral and legislative parties, reproducing in Africa 
the almost universal tendency of presidential regimes to constrict the structure of 
party systems.  But, just as consistently, the interaction of proximity and the 
Effective Number of Presidential Candidates counters this effect, indicating, for 
the reasons detailed above, the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in shaping 
strategic entry as well as voter behaviour in presidential elections (Cox 1997: 
211). 
 
District magnitude, widely acknowledged as the most important institutional 
variable that shapes the structure of party systems, has no independent effect on 
the structure of electoral party systems (Models 1 and 3 in Table 6).  This 
unexpected result may reflect the workings of weakly institutionalised electoral 
                                                                                                                                                                      
above and below the mean value into an equation to obtain the additive and multiplicative 
coefficients. 
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systems, but it also indicates the effect of context.  The two, of course, are not 
mutually exclusive.  District magnitude is a hard constraint to which political 
actors must strategically adjust.  In emerging democracies, however, political 
actors’ limited knowledge and understanding of institutional incentives and the 
salience of ethnopolitical cleavages as alternative incentive structures vitiate the 
expected strategic consequences of district magnitude, but without totally 
removing its mechanical effects.  In other words, candidates and voters in 
emerging democracies rely on familiar cues of ethnopolitical affiliations for 
cost-effective coordination of electoral strategies, but district magnitude may 
still mechanically exert a moderating influence.  This is why I test for the joint 
effects of institutional and contextual variables (Models 3-4).  This test shows 
that district magnitude does have a significant effect, but only in interactive 
combinations with ethnopolitical cleavages.  In the additive Model 3, for 
instance, district magnitude has no independent effect on the number of electoral 
and legislative parties.  But in the fully specified Model 4, which includes an 
interaction term measuring the product of district magnitude and the two 
ethnopolitical cleavage measures, district magnitude substantially reduces the 
number of electoral and legislative parties.13 
Large district magnitudes tend to reduce the number of parties if ethnopolitical 
fragmentation is high and ethnopolitical concentration is low, as exemplified by 
South Africa, but they tend to increase the number of parties if both 
fragmentation and concentration are high, as exemplified by Benin.  In South 
Africa, ethnopolitical groups are highly fragmented (fragmentation index = 
7.89) due to substantial cleavages among the nine groups that comprise the 
majority of African population as well as among the English-speakers and the 
Afrikaners that comprise the White population.  They are also spatially 
dispersed (concentration index = 1.6).  However, the continued strategic 
importance of race as a cost-effective basis of electoral mobilisation diminishes 
the political significance of intra-group cleavages among African voters, while 
White voters typically tend to divide their votes among several smaller parties.  
As a result, 2.2 is the average effective number for both electoral parties and 
legislative parties in South Africa over two elections, even though the average 
district magnitude is 40 seats and the allocation rule is the highly proportional 
Largest-Remainder Droop formula. 
 
                                                     
13A caveat is in order here.  I used the Aikaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayes 
Criterion to determine the superiority of the three-way interaction between district magnitude, 
ethnopolitical fragmentation and ethnopolitical concentration over the two-way interaction 
between district magnitude and each of the two ethnopolitical cleavage measures.  This test, 
however, produced ambiguous results, even though the same test used in the analysis based 
on a different dataset determined the superiority of the three-way interaction model 
(Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003).  I don’t have an explanation for this discrepancy, 
which I will resolve when I revise the paper. 
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In Benin, ethnopolitical groups are only slightly less fragmented than in South 
Africa (fragmentation index = 7.30), but they are also more geographically 
concentrated, principally in the administrative provinces that form the electoral 
districts (concentration index = 3.0).  Combined with an average district 
magnitude of 11 seats and with the highly proportional Largest-Remainder Hare 
formula as the allocation rule, this concentration has fostered correspondingly 
fragmented party systems, with the average effective numbers of electoral and 
legislative parties at 11.85 and 7.0, respectively. 
 
Finally, even moderate levels of geographical concentration of ethnopolitical 
groups tends to offset the expected constraining effects of ethnopolitical 
fragmentation and small district magnitudes on the number of parties, as 
exemplified by Kenya and Malawi.  In both countries, seats are allocated by 
plurality formula in single member districts.  But in Kenya, which has a 
fragmentation index of 9.5 and a concentration index of 2.3, the average 
effective numbers of electoral and legislative parties are 3.6 and 2.7, 
respectively.  In Malawi, which has a fragmentation index of 5.76 and a 
concentration index of 2.77, the effective numbers of electoral and legislative 
parties are 2.7 and 2.6, respectively. 
 
The influence of district magnitude on the structure of party systems in Africa’s 
emerging democracies thus reflects a complex pattern of interaction with 
ethnopolitical cleavages.  Large district magnitudes tend to reinforce the 
reductive effect of highly fragmented and spatially dispersed ethnopolitical 
groups on the number of parties.  Large district magnitudes tend to reinforce the 
expansive effect of spatially concentrated but otherwise fragmented 
ethnopolitical groups on the number of parties.  Small district magnitudes tend 
to reduce the number of parties when ethnopolitical groups are fragmented, but 
tend to increase them when ethnopolitical groups are spatially concentrated. 
 
 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
 
The results of the preceding data analysis demonstrate that both institutions and 
context matter, but not reflexively.  They matter strategically and contingently.  
Hence, they stress the need for contextually sensitive analysis that pays 
systematic attention to how social structural variations combine with 
institutional variations to produce varied political outcomes.  These results also 
demonstrate that understanding the role of ethnopolitical cleavages in shaping 
electoral outcomes requires attention (1) to patterns of ethnopolitical 
fragmentation as well as to patterns of ethnopolitical concentration and (2) to the 
interaction between variations in these patterns and variations in electoral 
institutions governing both legislative and presidential elections.  Attention to 
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patterns of both ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration draws attention 
to social structural variations that has important implications for how 
ethnopolitical cleavages facilitate strategic coordination between voters and 
candidates over votes and seats.  For instance, the two sources of ethnopolitical 
cleavages independently produce opposite effects, with fragmentation restricting 
and concentration expanding party systems; interactively they tend to expand 
party systems. 
 
Ethnopolitical cleavages produce these effects independently of electoral 
institutions (Model 2) as well as in additive (Model 3) and interactive (Models 4 
and 5) combinations with them.  In the fully specified Model 4, moreover, they 
substantially improve both the magnitude and the significance of the effect of 
electoral institutions for legislative elections.  But they also influence the effect 
of electoral institutions on presidential elections because of the interaction of the 
effective numbers of presidential candidates and the proximity of presidential 
and legislative elections.  The proximity of these two elections alone tends to 
reduce the effective number of electoral and legislative parties.  But the 
interaction of proximity with the effective number of presidential candidates, 
which partly reflects the underlying importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in 
defining the group interests presidential candidates seek to represent, tends to 
increase the effective number of electoral and legislative parties. 
 
The role of ethnopolitical cleavages in mediating the effects of electoral 
institutions on political outcomes has important implications for the analysis and 
understanding of new democratic institutions in ethnically plural societies.  It 
implies the need for a contextually sensitive approach that requires prior 
specification not only of the politically relevant ethnic groups but also of the 
bases of intra-group similarity and differences, inter-group differentiation and 
the resulting patterns of fragmentation and concentration.  Central to this 
specification is the distinction, elaborated elsewhere (Mozaffar 2001), between a 
multi-ethnic society (typically comprised of a large number of roughly equal 
groups) and a deeply divided society (typically comprised of small number of 
highly cohesive and sharply polarised groups).  Institutional solutions such as 
multi-ethnic coalitions, affirmative action policies and plurality formulas with 
single-member districts are likely to be appropriate for a multi-ethnic society, 
while institutional solutions such as power sharing, federalism and proportional 
representation formulas are likely to be more appropriate for a deeply-divided 
society.  To complicate matters, the two types of ethnically plural societies are 
not rigid, but quite malleable.  Multi-ethnic societies can and do become deeply-
divided societies, a precondition for violent conflict, while deeply-divided 
societies can and do become multi-ethnic societies, the preferred outcome of 
negotiated settlements of violent ethnic conflicts.  The analytical challenge here 
is to develop appropriate measures of ethnopolitical fragmentation that can 
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usefully distinguish between a multi-ethnic and a deeply divided society.  The 
dataset on ethnopolitical groups I utilised in this paper meets this challenge by 
providing three levels of inclusiveness for ethnopolitical groups.  It shows that 
twelve African countries have been, or have the potential of becoming, deeply-
divided societies because they have national dichotomous national cleavages: 
Burundi, Benin, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.  Of these, only 
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti and Rwanda are permanently deeply-divided 
societies.  The others are typically multi-ethnic societies because they have 
politically significant lower level cleavages that produce politically salient intra-
group cleavages. 
 
Finally, a context sensitive analysis as presented in this paper helps to directly 
confront the highly problematic notion that that ethnic heterogeneity is 
antithetical to democracy and democratic consolidation in Africa.  Claims of 
such antipathy typically posit a reflexive relationship between ethnicity and 
democracy that is grossly misconstrued, based on the fundamentally flawed 
primordialist conception of ethnicity, and reflects an odious one-dimensional 
view of ethnic identities.  Democratic stability is typically threatened when 
ethnopolitical cleavages reflect the configuration of deeply divided societies in 
which two internally cohesive, sharply polarised and spatially mixed groups are 
implacably arrayed against each other, as exemplified most brutally in 
contemporary Africa by Rwanda and Burundi.14  Ethnopolitical cleavages in the 
other 38 African countries manifest a predominantly multiethnic configuration 
engendered by the combination of salient inter-group and intra-group cleavages.  
Within these dominant multiethnic configurations, therefore, variations in the 
incidence and interaction of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration, and 
in the relationship of these two cleavage dimensions to electoral institutions, 
offer partial but crucial insights into, as well as reasons for cautious optimism 
about, the relationship between ethnopolitical diversity and the prospective 
stability of Africa’s emerging democracies. 
 
                                                     
14But Comoros and Djibouti with similar ethnopolitical configurations have not experienced 
similar brutality or violence. 
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